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Adjustment faces political obstacles to the extent  subsequent liberalization - for example,
that it imposes costs on groups within society  promoting exports by setting up bonded export
that are important to government or threatens the  facilities and duty and tax drawback systems
stability of a regime.  before trying to liberalize imports.
It faces organizational obstacles to the extent  By contrast, countries with political flexibil-
that it imposes tasks that government bureaucra-  ity but weak organizational capabilities - in-
cies are incapable of meeting.  cluding many in Sub-Saharan Africa - should
avoid roundabout measures.  It is easier for them
Political obstacles can undermine decisions  to dismantle poor regulations and interventionist
about the extent of reform and efforts to imple-  institutions than it is to get them to stop con-
ment reform.  Organizational obstacles affect  straining economic activity and start supporting
mostly implementation.  it.
Levy argues that policy reform should be  In politically flexible but organizationally
designed one way in countries with strong or-  weak countries, free entry should be favored
ganizational capabilities but limited political  over the establishment of one-stop shops to
flexibility and quite another way when the  streamline bureaucratic requirements for new
situation is reversed.  entrants; targeted investment incentives should
be abolished rather than rewritten to favor
Organizationally strong but politically  socially efficient subsidization; and import
constrained countries should start with round-  liberalization should be pursued as much as
about (indirect) but administratively irntensive  possible, not finessed through support for
reforms as a way of building a constituency for  exporters.
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Polly Means.THE DESIGN AND SEOUENCING  OF TRADE  AND INVESTMENT  POLICY  REFORM:
AN  ~INS1arIQrNAL ANALYSIS
1.  INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes frowm  an institutional perspective the experiences of twelve
countries with selected aspects of trade and ihvestment  policy reform. Over the past decade,
financial  support for these and other reforms has been central to the lending program of the
World Bank. However, as is increasingly  apparent.' the results of the reform efforts have been
mixed: the gaps often are substantial between the policy implications  of economic analysis  and
the policy reforms that are agreed upon with governments,  between the reform commitments of
governments and the reforms that are undertaken in practice, and between the expected and
actual supply rsponses  of reforming economies. This mixed record has focused attention on the
design of reform packages  on the appropriate mix of policies to be included in such packages,
and on the appropriate sequence in which policy  reforms should be introduced. The present
paper analyzs  the issue of the appropriate mix and sequence of trade and investment policy
reform from an institutional perspective.
An institutional analysis  highlights  two distinct but related determinants of the
appropriate design of policy reforn  -- the organizational  capabilities  of public bureaucracies,  and
the political flexibility  of governments.  As the analysis  that follows  will reveal, there exist
significant  variations  among countries in their organizational  capabilities  and in their political
commitments to change; policies also vary significantly  in their organizational  and political
demands. It follows  that the appropriate mix and sequence of policy reforms will be quite
different for countries with strong political commitment to policy reform but relatively  weak
organizational  capabilities  than for countries with strong organizational  capabilities  but only
limited political commitment to reform. The design of lending programs supported by the World
Bank should respond to these differences among countries.
The next two sections of this paper lay out the analytical  framework for an
institutional analysis,  and review from an institutional perspective  the experience of twelve
countries with selected aspects of trade and investment  policy reform. The final section analyzes
the reasons for the divergent patterns that are observed across countries and policies, and
examines the implications  of the analysis  for lending by the World Bank for trade and
investment policy reform.
II.  A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
A central objective  of this paper is to analyze concretely how lending programs
for trade and investment policy reform might be adapted to an individual  country's
organizational  capabilities  and political commitment  to policy reform. The starting point for
analysis  must thus be the distinction between organizational  and political obstacles to reform.
I  For an overview,  see "Adjustment  Lending: An Evaluation of Ten Years of Experience"
Policy  and Research Series 1, Country Economics  Department, The World Bank.-2-
Organizational and political obstacks can be differentiated in two complementary
ways - by focusing on the character of the obstacls  themselves,  and by focusing  on the point in
the policy process at which each ol,Atacle  has its impact. To begin with the character of the
obstack.  adjustment faces political obstacles insofar as it imposes costs on groups within society
--perhaps private actors, perhaps the government bureaucracy  itself - that are important to
government, or more broadly threatens regime stability;  adjustment faces organizational
obstacls  insofar as it imposes tasks on government bureaucracy  which that bureaucracy  lacks
the capability  to meet. As for the relation between obstacles and the policy  process, the key
distinction here is whether the obstacles influence the reform decisions  of government or
whether, subsequent to the decisions,  they influence the way in which the reform program is
implemented?2
It is plausible to hypothesize  that political obstacles can both influence decisions
about the extent of reform and can underinea  efforts to implement proclaimed reforms. by
contrast, organizational  obstacles emerge disproportionately  in implementation. This distinction
between limitations in the extent of reforms countries decide to pursue, and limitations in
subsquent  implementation should, therefore, offer useful insights as to the relative importance
of political and organizational  obstacles in inhibiting  efforts at reform.
One additional distinction  is useful in analyzing  the impact of policy lending by
the World Bank. Policy  lending generally  is based on agreements3  between the World Bank and
the borrowing country as to the specific content of the reforms that will be undertaken.
However, these agreements usually  are concluded before adoption by the borrowing  country of
the proposed reforms; sometimes, agreements with the World Bank notwithstanding,  reforms
are not adopted.
To incorporate th:s last distinction,  this paper examines three interrelated
dimensions  of country experiences with policy reform: scope, adoption, and implementation.
Program scope is defined by the extent of the proposed reforms in trade and investment policy
and practices in relation to the gap at the outset of reform between policies in place and the
putative policy regime of a fully-liberalized  economy. The scope of a country's reform program
is ranked ordinally as limited, moderate, extensive,  or very extensive. Note that scope is ranked
according to how far an individual  country has travelled along the path from its specific starting
point to a fully-liberal  economy, not according to how distorted the economy was initially,  nor
2 This sharp distinction between policy  decisions and policy implementation is consistent
with the blueprint approach to policymaking  generally followed  by the World Bank but criticized
sharp:y for the inflexible  way in which it limits feedback from implementation to policy  design
by, among others, David Korten in, for example, 'Community Organization  and Rural
Development: A Learning Process Approach", Public  Administration RTeview  40, September
1980, pp. 488-511.  As the critics acknowledge,  policies and projects vary in the extent to which
they can be designed adequately up-front. The policies analyzed  in this paper are those where
the scope for pre-planning is substantial and the associated necessity  of fluid design thus
relatively limited.
3 These agroements often - but not ahways  -- are incorporated in formal conditions attached
to World Bank loans. The present paper makes no attempt to differentiate proposed reforms
on the basis of whether or not tb-y were included in formal conditions.3 -
how distoited it remains at the end (as of the time of writing this paper) of the reform process,
nor acwording  to the absolute magnitude of policy change. Program adoption refers to the step
whereby a government proceeds from agreements made with the World Bank to official public
pronouncements in its home country that it intends to proceed with those commitments
Progtam implementation refers to the extent to which announced reforms indeed were carried
out in practice. The categories used to rank both adoption and implementation  are limited
progress, significant  progress, and achieved. Adoption is ranked in relation to proposed scope;
implementation is ranked in relation to what was actually  adopted. The ordinal judgements as to
variations among countries in the scope, adoption and implementation of reforms necessarily
include some subjective  element.
III.  COUNTRY EXPERIENCE WITH TRADE AND INVESTMENT  POLICY REFORM
The central objectives  of trade and investment  policy reform are to improve
alkocative  and productive efficiency  - to put in place a set of relative prices that increases the
economic efficiency  with which countries allocate their resources, and to increase the
competitive pressure on enterprises as a way of inducing  firms progressively  to increase their
productivity.  Three conplerentary  policy reforms have been identified to achieve these
objectives  - the promotior if  import competition, the promotion of domestic competition, and
the promotion of produc  an for exports.'
An institutional analysis  of the full range of policy reforms in each of the three
areas of competition policy is beyond the scope of the present paper; rather, the paper analyzes
country experiences with selected policies within each area. Twelve countries were chosen non-
randomlny  for inclusion  in the study to illustrate the diversity  of country and World Bank
experience. Table 1 details the policy-based  loans made by tLe World Bank in the 1980s  that
addressed trade and investment  policy issues in these countries. The next three subsections
delineate from an institutional perspective country experiences  with selected policy reforms to
promote import competition, domestic competition, and production for exports.
The Promotion of Import Competition
Within the larger set of policies that promote import competition, the paper
reviews from an institutional perspective  efforts to elin.;nate qu ntitative restriction and to move
towards a low and uniform tariff structure. 5
4 For a review of each of these areas of policy  reform, see Claudio Frischtak, "Competition
Policies for Industrializing  Countries",  Industry Development  Division, PPR, The World Bank,
March 10, 1989.
' Additional policies relevant to import liberalization that might usefully  be reviewed from
an institutional perspective but were beyond the scope of this paper include efforts to unify
exchange rates, and to allobate foreign exchange according  to market rather than administrative
.riteria.-4-
TABI  1:  LENDING  BY  =I  WORL  BAN  FOR ltRADE  AND
POLIC  REFORM  IN  TWELVE COUJNTREES
LOANS/CREDITS  TOWARDS TRADE  AMOUNT
COUNTRY  YEAR  AND INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS  (S million)
Bangladesh  1987  Industrial Sector Credit  190.0
1989  Export Development Project  25.0
Ghana  1984  Export Rehabilitation  75.9
1986  Industrial Sector Adjustment  53.5
1987  Structural Adjustment Program  34.0
1989  Second Phase of Structural  120.0
Adjustment Program
Guinea  1982  Industrial Rehabilitation & Promotion  19.0
1986  Structural Adjustment I  42.0
1988  Structural Adjustment I  65.0
Jamaica  1981  Export Development  Fund II  37.0
1982  Structural Adjustment I  76.2
1982  Kingston  Export Free Zone  13.5
1983  Export Development  Fund III  30.±
1983  Industrial Credit  15.1
1984  Structural Adaustment  II  60.2
1986  Structural Adjustment II  55.0
198?  Trade and Finance Sector Adjustmnent  40.0
Kenya  1980  Export Promotion T.A.  4.5
1980  Structural Adjustment I  55.0
1982  Structural Adjustment II  130.9
1988  Industrial Sector Adjustment  165.7
Mauritius  1981  Structural Adustment 1  15.0
1983  Structural Adjustment II  4,.0
1987  Industrial Sector Adjustment  25.0
1988  Industrial Finance Project  10.0
Mc.xico  1983  Export Development  350.0
1986  Industrial Recovery  150.0
1986  Trade Policy Loan  500.0
1987  Export Development II  250.0
1987  Second Trade Policy  Loan  500.0
1987  Small & Medium Scale Industry IV  270.0
1989  Industrial Restructuring  250.0
1989  Industry Sector Policy  500.0LOANS/CREDITS  TOWARDS TRADE  AMOUNT
YEAR  AND INDUSTRIAL PROJEC'rS  (S million)
Morocco  3984  Industrial Trade and Policy  Adjustment 1  150.4
1985  Industrial Trade and Policy  Adjustment II  200.0
1987  Industrial Export Finance  70.0
1988  Structural Adjustment I  200.0
Pakistan  1982  Structural Adjustment Loan  60.0
1985  Industrial Investment Credit II  148.0
1986  Export Development  70.0
1988  Agricultural  Sector Adjustment  200.0
1989  Industrial Investment Credit III  148.0
1989  Fmancial Sector Adjustment  150.0
Philippines  1980  Structural Adjustment I  200.0
1983  Structural Adjustment II  302.3
1987  Economic Recovery  300.0
1989  Financial Sector Adjustment  300.0
Thailand  1982  Structural Adjustment Loan  150.0
1983  Structural Adjustment II  175.5
Tunisia  1985  Export ,ndustries  72.4
1987  Industry and Trade Policy  Adjustmeitt  150.0
1988  Small & Medium Scale Industrial Dev. II  28.0
1988  Structural Adjustment  150.0
1989  Public Enterprise Reform  130.0Eiaaifating guantitative  restrictions. Table 2 summarizes the experience with
reform of quantitative restrictions in twelve countries (with two separate entries for the
Philippines).  On the basis of the judgements summarized  in the table, the countries can be
categorized into four distinct groups.
The first group comprises Bangladesh  and the Philippines (since Corazon
Aquino became president). In both countries, QR protection was substantial, but the scope of
reform agreed upon in negotiation with the Wcrld Bank was moderate; the countries declared
their intentions to reduce somewhat the range of imports subject to QRs, but via ad hoc
incremental procedures. Both countries appear to have moved ahead with the adoption and
implementation of these moderate reforms.
The seownd  group comprises Kenya (prior to 1988), the Philippines (during the
Marcos era), Pakistan, and Tunisia, all also heavily OR protected prior to reform. In
negetiations with the World Bank, these countries proposed reforms of QRs that were micre
tensive than those of the first group. In both Kenya and the Philippines,  QR liberalization
was aborted in the wake of balance of payments  crises. But even before these crises, there was
evidence that political opposition would limit program adoption; and for four years after the
crisis had passed there was little effort 'n Kenya to resume liberalization.  Pakistan reducef&  QRs
incrementally  throughout the 1980s,  but the reform process has been very uneven; in ird-1987,
for exa.-ple, the govmrnment  banned imports of some items at the same time as it eas'-:
quantitative restrictions on others.' As for Tunisia, that country's government was quite explicit
that its hesitations in following  through with its initial intentions (intentions not reflected in
markedly more modest formal conditions) were root_d in fear of the political consequences  of
the plant closures and associated unemployment  it expected to follow from liberalization  of
QRs.7
The third group comprises Ghana, Jamaica, Mexico,  Morocco, Mauritius and
Thailand. All six countries achieved far-reaching  success in the elimination of QRs -- although
the extent to which these successes  imply genuine reductions in import protection depends also
upon parallel changes in import tariff policies.' Ghana, Jamaica, Mexico  and Morocco began
their reform efforts with near-universal  QRs on imports; as of mid-1989,  QRs had been
eliminated entirely in Ghana, almost entirely in Jamaica, afforded protection for only 14% of
total import value (but 40% of local production) in Morocco, and for 22% of local production
in Mexico.  Especially  in Mexico,  the political obstacles to QP. reform appear to have been
substantial.
' The World BRnk,  Pakistan: Growth Through Adiustment Report Number 7118-Pak,
March 21, 1988, pp. 64-72; also The World Bank, Pakistan: Medium-Term  Economic Policy
Adiustments. Report Number 7591-PAK,  March 17, 1989.
' Tunisian government officials  communicated  these fears to World Bank staff in the course
of a recent review  of the country's industrial sector.
I As reviewed below, Mexico,  Morocco and Ghana also made significant  progress in tariff
reform; but tariff reform has proceeded slowly  in Mauritius,  Thailand and (until recently)
Jamaica.-7-
LUIL  COUNTRY  EXPRJECE  WITH RMOVAL OF OUANTITATIVE  RESTRICTIONS
IMPLEMENTATION  OF
GROUPSICOUNTRIES  SOPE  ADOPTION  ADOPTED  RE-  ;OM
Groun 1: Moderate reform. adogted and iMrnlemented
Bangladesh  Moderate  Achieved  Achieved
Philippines  Moderate  Achieved  Achieved
(under Aquino)
Group 2I Proijlems  with adootion
Kenya  Extensive  Limited  Achieved
(prior to 1988)  Progress
Philippines  Extensive  Limited  Achieved
(under Marcos)  Progress
Pakistan  Moderate  Significant  Achieved
Progress
Tunisia  Fxtensive  Limited  Achieved
Progress
GrouR 3: Extensive reform. adopted and implemented
Mexico  Very Extensive  Achieved  Achieved
Ghana  Very Extensive  Achieved  Achieved
Thailand  Very Extensive  Achieved  Achieved
Mauritius  Very Exn%  isive  Achieved  AEchieved
Morocco  Extensive  Achieved  Achieved
Jamaica  Very Extensive  Achieved  Achieved
Group 4: Implementation problems
Guinea  Very Extensive  Achieved  Significant
Progress
Kenya  Moderate  Significant  Significant
(Since 1988)  Progress  Progress-8-
Between 1985 and 1988, the Meaican Ministry  of Trade and Industry (SECOFI) sought at each
stap  to undercut efforts to eliminate QRs: the same day as the Ministry of Finance (which
contsoled import licenses) announced its first reduction of ORs, SECOFI trebled the reference
prices apinst  which tariffs were calculated;  subsequently  it made recourse to anti-dumipino
procedure. as a protective device. But, consistent with the clear commitment to dismantling
QRs at the highest reaches of the Mexican  government, both obstacles to import liberalization
were removed quite speedily.' As for Mauritius  and Thailand, in neither country had QRs been
an important instrument of protectior., although in both its use was rising prior to policy
reform. The reform progrims of both countries were succeoful in eliminating  entirely the use
of QRs.
Only Guinea and Kenya (since 1988), the countries in the fourth group ran into
some diffiulties with implmentation.  In Kenya, implementation  was slowed somewhat  by
administrative  difficulties  in making the transition from one relatively complex  schedule of QR
restrctions  to another, additionally,  Kenya fWiled  to adopt QP. hiberalization  for some products
that were initially  to be ir.....Jed in the reform." Notwithstanding  a 1987 decision in Guinea to
abolish what had been a rear-universal system of import licensing,  as of early 1989 the Guinean
Central Bank continued to exercise some administrative  discretion in allocating foreign exchange
for imports; additionally,  there were isolated instances  where privatization  of state-owned
enterprises was accompanied by restrictions on imports in the affected industry." Overall,
though, in both Guinea and Kenya (post-1988)  progress has beeni  significant  in following
through on their respective (and quite different in scope) reforms.
Reforming the structure of tariffs. Prior to the initiation of reform efforts, tariff
regimes were ine.i'9cient  in all twelve countries, with high average nominal tariffs, high standard
deviations,  and the familiar cascading  structure. Table 3 breaks down the countries subsequer,t
experiences  with tariff reform into three groups.
The first group comprises two countries -- Kenya and Mauritius  -- which
committed themselves to relatively limited reforms but followed  through successfully  on these
commitments. Kenya has painstakingly  made its tariff schedule somewhat more uniform over
almost a decade, with the intention of accelerating  the process once QR liberalization is
completed. Prior to 1987 Mauritius made little effort to reform tariffs,  even as it moved ahead
rapidly with efforts at export promotion (on which more later); in 1987 it adopted -- and
apparently has followed  through with - a somewhat more ambitious program of tariff
liberalization.
'Information  from an interview  with a World Bank official involved  in lending to Mexico
during the relevant period.
u 'Aide Memoire", World Bank Supervision Mission,  Industrial Sector Adjustment Credit,
March 1-17, 1989.
" This and other details of implementation difficulies in Guinea are from World Bank,
'Private Sector Promotion Adjustment Operation: Draft Initiating Memorandum",  May 1989,  and
from intervimews  with World Bank officials  active in Guinea.-9-
XABUL'b  COUNTU  CESTM  TARIFF REFOM
IMPLEMENTATION
ORQU  UNTRIES  SCOPE  ADOP'TION  OF ADOPTED REFORM
GrouR 1: Moderate refoisns. ado,oted  and imolemented
Kenya  Moderate  Achieved  Achieved
Mauritius  Moderate  Achieved  Achieved
Grout, 2: Problems with adoRtion
Bangladesh  Moderate  Significant  Achieved
Progress
Morocco  Extensive  Significant  Achieved
Progress
Pakistan  Moderate  Significant  Achieved
Progress
Thailand  Extensive  Limited  Achieved
Progress
Group 3: Extensive reforms. adopted and implemented
Ghana  Extensive  Achieved  Achieved
Mexico  Very Extensive  Achieved  Achieved
Philippines  Extensive  Achieved  Achieved
Tunisia  Very Extensive  Achieved  Achieved
Jamaica  Extensive  Too soon  Too soon
to tell  to tell
Group 4: Extensive  reform. implementation rroblems
Guinea  Very Extensive  Achieved  Limited
Progress- 10-
The second group comprise  Thailand, Morocco, Bangladesh  and Pakistan. All
four countries ran into obstacles as they endeavored to adopt their tariff reforms. In Thailand,
adoption 9-  inhibited by the constnsual character of Thai decision-making  and a
rdlatedunwilliigness  to face down oprosition by those private industrialists that stood to lose
from tariff liberalization.  Consequently  (perhaps buttressed by fiscal considerations), moves to
lberalize tariffs repeatedly were offset by countervailing  increases; although the reforms did
succeed in imposing  a 609%o  ceiling  on nominal tariffs, there has been little change in the level
and dispersion of effective protection. 1 2 Morocco's reform program also was
slowed by an unwillingness  (apparently for both fiscal and political reasons) to reduce some
tariff  to the extent initially planned; even so, by mid-1989  both the level and dispersion of
taris  had narrowed significantly.  Bangladesh's  goals were modest, and its achievements yet
more limited: the country successfully  rationalized  tariff  in some targeted sectors, but failed to
fi-low through with its initial intention to impose a 100% nominal tariff ceiling on all imported
items. As for Pakistan, although the scope of proposed tariff reforms was modest prior to 1988,
the country failed to follow through with what it did proclaim, with ad hoc increases in some
tariffs, and ad hoc reduction in others; a new, somewhat  more ambitious round of tariff reforms
initiated in mid-1988  appears to hold the promise of achieving  more uniformity in the tariff
structure over time.
The third group comprises five countries -- Mexico,  Tunisia, the Philippines,
Ghana and Jamaica. The first four of these countries agreed on extensive or very cxtensive
programs to move towards low and uniform tariffs in negotiations  with the World Bank, and
adopted and implemented essentially  their entire program -- although the extent to which these
successes imply genuine reductions in import protection depends also on parallel changes in QR
policies.3 As for Jamaica, in the course of three SALs between 1982  and 1986 little effort was
made to narrow the band of tariffs  or to eliminate the large number of ad hoc exemptions from
tariff payments granted to firms. Indeed, between 1982  and 1986 tariff protection actually
increased somewhat with the imposition  of stamp duties and -eference prices subsequent to the
,elaxation of QRs. A more serious, phased effort at tariff reform was initiated in 1987.
Adoption and implementation  ef the initial measures apparently has proceeded quite smoothly,
while the latter phases have nit yet been undertaken.
Guinea was the only representative of a fourth group of countries where a very
extensive program was obstructed by difficulties  in implementation:  a uniform tariff code
adopted in 1986  was undermined by tariff exemptions negotiated with firms on an ad hoc basis
by individual  ministries;  and Guinean customs operated almost as an independent fiefdom, with
payoffs apparently crucial in decisions  as to whether or not to reject tariff exemptions agreed
upon by individual  ministries, and in the degree to which onerous documentary requirements
blocked clearance of imported goods.
12, See The World Bank, Thailand: BuAlding  on the Recent Success, Report No-7445-TH,
February 21, 1989, pp. 58-60; also Thailand: Growth with Stability.  Report No-6036-TH,  June 5,
1986 p. 147. There is no evidence that the somewhat chaotic organization of Thailand's tariff
review  process (highlighted  in the 1986  report, pp. 155-157)  contributed to the imposition  of
broad-ranging  counterveiling  measures subseqent to each effort at tariff liberalization.
'  As reviewed earlier, Mexico,  Ghana and Jamaica made substantial - but Tunisia limited,
and the Philippines moderate -- progress in their reforms of QRs.- 11  -
Some 2aterns.  Two patterns evident in the above review  will be important in
the analysis in the final section of this paper. First, limitations in organizational  capability  do
not appear to represent a significant  obstacle to import libera.ization;  only in Guinea and Kenya
-- and  (Guinea's  tariff reform  aside) only to a limited extent  -- did difficulties in implementation
hinder the elimination  of QRs and the reform of tariffs. Second, political obstacles to import
liberalization (which, as noted earlier, are disproportionately likely  to manifest themselves via
limitations in scope or adoption) appear to be rather more substantial.' 4 Scope or adoption was
Umited  or moderate for six of the twelve countries for QR liberalization,  and for five of the
twelve countries for tariff reform." Only Mexico,  Morocco and Ghana" unambiguously  achieved
significant  reductions in import protection via extensive reforms of both QR and tariff policies.
The Promotion of Domestic Competition
Within the larger set of policies that promote domestic competition, the paper
reviews from an institutional perspective  efforts to eliminate direct regulatory impediments to
entry and to reform investment  incentives."
Eliminating  regulatorv obstacles to entry. The focus here is on direct
bureaucratic impediments to entry by new firrns (registration and licensing prerequisites, entry
and investment approvp!s  and the like); the myriad of indirect impediments such as labor laws,
building codes, and financing  impediments thus fall outside the scope of the present analysis.
Table 4 reviews country progress in eliminating these direct regulatory obstacles to entry for
domestic firms.' 8
4 The World Bank, "Strengthening  Trade Policy Reform",  Trade Policy  Division,  Country
Economics Department, PPR, October 1989,  summarizes in some detail the character of the
political obstacles that inhibit import liberalization.
"S  Interestingly,  none of the twelve countries followed  the sequence that is sometimes
recommended of increasing tariffs  as a way of smoothing the process of liberalizing  QRs on
imports; note though that QR liberalization  preceded subsequent tariff reform in Morocco and
Jamaica, while import reforms in Mauritius  and Thailand could plausibly  be interpreted as in
process, with the initial steps now completed.
" The Philippines  and Jamaica might plausibly  be added to this list -- the former if (rather
than break down the import liberalization  experience into two distinct periods) the magnitude of
change is calibrated over the decade between 1979 and 1989, the latter insofar as the 1987 tariff
reforms have indeed been successfully  adopted and implemented.
17  Additional policies relevant to the promotion of domestic competition that might usefully
be reviewed from an institutional perspective  but were beyond the scope of this paper include
the regulation of monopolistic  practices,  price controls and the regulation of ti;ding, and the
organization of financial intermediation.
uThe  regulation of foreign investment  is not analyzed  in the present paper.- 12 -
TIILE4a  COUNTRY  EXPERIENCES  WITH REFORM OF ENTRY REGUIATIONS
IMPLEMENTATION
QROUPS/COUNTRI  SCOPE  ADOPTION  OF ADOPTED REFORM
Growl 1: Moderate reforTns
Ghana  Limited  Achieved  Limited progress
Kenya  Moderate  Too Soon To Tell  Too Soon To Tell
Mexico  Limited  Too Soon To Tell  Too Soon To Tell
Jamaica  Unaddressed
Group 2: Extensive reforms. adolted  and imWlemented
Pakistan  Extensive  Achieved  Achieved
Bangladesh  Extensive  Achieved  Achieved





Group 3: Extensive reforms, implementation Droblems
Guinea  Very Extensive  Achieved  Limited progress- 13 -
in the first group identified in the table -- Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, and Mexico --
the scope of entry reform has been modest. Prior to 1989, Mexico  made little effort to ease
the nation's substantial bureaucratic obstacles to entry, although there are indications  that the
country is about to embark"' on a far-reaching  effort in this area. Both Kenya and Ghana have
endeavored to put in place 'one-stop shops' to ease
the bureaucratic hurdles for putative entrants. While the verdict is still out on the Kenyan
experience, so far implementation has been weak in Ghana: new investments  remain subject to
requirements of prior approval; despite some efforts at streamlining,  the approval procedures of
Ghana's National Investment Commission  remain time-consuming  and cumbersome. As for
Jamaica, the reduction of bureaucratic obstacles to entry -- although they apparently are quite
substantialP  - has not yet found its way onto the reform agenda.
In the second group of countries - comprising Bangladesh,  Pakistan,  Tunisia and
Guinea-- significant  efforts were made to ease direct bureaucratic obstacles to entry. [Thailand,
Morocco,2 Mauritius and the Philippinesn  permitted free entry prior to the initiation of the
reform process; hence the absence in those countries of any reform measures in this area.] In
Tunisia, clearance requirements for putative new entrants were abolished entirely; in Bangladesh
i  negative list was established, with free entry permitted for all but explicitly  restricted sectors
and other investments in excess of a (relatively  large) minimum size; in Pakistan, the investment
ceiling above which clearance for new entrants was required was increased from Rs6O  million in
1984 to Rs 500 million in 1988. No evidence was uncovered in Tunisia, Bangladesh  or Pakistan
of difficulties  in either adoption or implementation,  although it should be noted that at least in
Tunisia even after the reform of entry regulations other obstacles continued to inhibit entry by
new firms. By contrast, in Guinea (the only country in the third group) reforms that were very
extensive in scope were undermined by severe problems of implementation.
It is instructive  to contrast the Tunisian and Guinean experience in eliminating
direct bureaucratic obstacles to entry. Subsequent to Guinea's 1987  reforms, most firms formally
were free to establish themselves  by the routine act of incorporation  at the Trade Registry. In
practice as of early 1989,  incorporation procedures continued to be onerous and time
consuming;  individual  ministries continued to require prior approval for all investments falling in
their domain of responsibility;  and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry continued to require
"9  In a first move, a sweeping  deregulation of the hitherto monopolistic  Mexican trucking
industry went into effect in September 1989.
20 See, The World Bank Jamaica: Adjustment Under Changing  Economic Conditions
Report No. 7753-JM,  April 26, 1989,  p. 39
21 In practice, difficulties  with land titles, with the issuance  of construction permits and in
obtaining access to finance represented real impediments to  mntry  by Moroccan firms. See The
World Bank, Morocco:  The Impact of Liberalization,  Report No. 6714-MOR, March 15, 1988 p.
59.
22  Philippine firms that failed to register with the Board of Investments  both were excluded
from investment incentives (discussed  in the next section) and were denied access to foreign
exchange.  Some efforts apparently were made to open access to foreign exchange to both
registered and unregistered firms, but no information  is available as to subsequent experience.14-
that aDl  lnn  be licensed for trading. Like Guinea, Tuniian  reforms formally freed firms from
the requirement that they obtain official  approval prior to entry. But unlie  Guinea the
elimination  of direct regulatory obstacls  to entry appeas  to hae  been fully  implemented.
While  the Agence de Promotion des Invest_sements  (API) - whicb had hithero  been
responsible for regulating  entry, along with approving investment  incentives (on which more
below) and generall  promoting industry - continues to operat,  a rCent World Bank mission
uncovered no evidence that API approval was any longer required by putative entrsnts  Bereft
of their regulatory function, the agency's staff  of 550 apparently occupied themseves with rather
vaguely  defined 'studies'. Whether the agenq  will attempt to fill its present vacuum of inactivity
with renewed efforts at regulation remains to be seen. So far, however, that has not happened. 
Reform  investment incenties.  At the outset of reform, incentive schedules in
all of the sample countries diciminated  among categoris  of investments in way  that had lttle
economic rationale. In principle, hberal reform might either eliminate all preferential subsidies,
or target subsidies in a transparent and efficient way to a hmited number of activities to
compensate for unambiguous  market failures.1'
As Table S summarizes, in Kenya, Pakistan  nd JamaicaU  reforms of investment
incentives  were entirely unaddressed in adjustment lending. In Ban8!adesh,  Morocco and
Thailand, the scope of reforms was relatively  modest. Morocco agreed in 1968 to reduce the
duration and rate of exemptions granted to enterprises through a.U  Investment Code; Bangladesh
created a Board of Investment in 1989. Reform of invesment incentives  has been on the
agenda of policy  dialogue between the World Bank and Government of Thailand since the early
1980, but has been painstakingly  slow. Explicit,  increasingly  detailed criteria for the provision of
incentives  were promulgated  by Thailand's Board of Investment in 1983 and again 1987,  and
efforts have been made since 1985 to streamline the procedures for processing applications. But
the criteria of eligibility  remain too broad to provide much guidance to potential investors.'
Four countries -- Tunisia (in 1987), Ghana (in 1985),  Guinea (in 1984 and again
in 1987)  and the Philippines (in 1983 and again in 1987) - moved more broadly to streamline
and make economically  more efficient their incentive packages.  While there was no evidence in
any of these countries of a gap between the scope of investment reforms and subsequent
aeoption, there was substantial evidence of difficulties  with implementation.
3  API's current role was examined in some detail during a June 1989 World Bank mission
to survey Tunisia's industrial sector.
24 Incentives  intended to secure trade neutrality for exporters will be analyzed later in this
paper.
2'  In Jamaica, investment incentives  often took the form of duty-free access to capital
goods and intermediate inputs for favored import-substituting  firms; reforms in these incentives
were noted earlier in the context of trade policy reform. Additional efforts at reforming
investment  incentives took on the narrc-  :ly institutional form of amalgamating  into a single
agency the three main bureaucracies  with responsibility  for the industrial sector.
21 For this judgement, see The World Bank Thailand: Building  on the Recent Success.
Report No. 7445-TH,  February 21, 1989,  p. 67.- 15  -
TABL3  :  COL;NR1  EXPIALRLNClS  WTH1l  REFORM OF INVESTMENT  INCENTIVES
IMPLEMENTATION
SCOPE  ADOPTION  OF ADOPTED REFORM
Gr0ut  1: No more than moderate reforms
Bangladesh  Limited  Too soon to te!l  Too soon to tell
Morocco  Moderate  Too soon to tell  Too soon to tell
Thailand  Moderate  Limited  Significant
Progress  Progress
Ke:  lya  Unaddressed
Jamaica  Unaddressed
Pakistan  Unaddressed
Grout  2: Extensive reforms. imDlementation  Droblems
Tunisia  Extensive  Achieved  Significant
Progress
Guinea  Extensive  Achieved  Limited progress
Philippines  Extensive  Achieved  Limited progress
(under Marcos)
Philippines  Extensive  Achieved  Too soon to tell
(under Aquino)
Ghana  Moderate  Achieved  Limited
Progress
Groug 3: Very extensive reforms. adopted and imDlemrnted
Mauritius  Very extensive  Achieved  Achieved
Mexico  Very extensive  Achieved  Achieved16-
Notwithstanding  simplification  of the Tunisian Investment Code, the criteria for eligibility
remained complex and obscure to most businessmen. The Philippines under Marcos was
notorious for favoring  political clients in the allocation of incentives even after the adoption in
1963  of extensive reforms of the system of investment incentives.' Incentives were reformed
again under President Aquino in 1987,  but it is too soon to tell" what will be the effectiveness
of the new round of reforms. In both Ghana and Guinea, approval procedures continue to be
lengthy, decisions  on occasion remain arbitrary, and there continues to be overlapping
ministerial  jurisdiction; in Guinea, notwithstanding  the formal authority of the National
Investment Commission  to negotiate incentives,  individual  ministries continue to negotiate
incentives packages,  including  various duty and tax exemptions, with firms on a case-1y-case
basis.
By contrast with the experience of countries that endeavored to simplify  their
codes, two countries - Mexico  and Mauritius - essentially  eliminated preferential incentives for
selectd  investments. In 1967 Mexico  eliminated almost entirely the CEPROFI package of tax
incentives  which had been the dominant vehicle for subsidizing  investments in the country,
similarly,  that same year Mauritius agreed with the World Bank to discontinue its practice of
granting Development Certificates for favored import substitution projects for all but
exceptional cases, 2 '. By all accounts, the abolition of these incentives  has proceeded smoothly in
both countries.
Some Datterns. Again, it is helpful to set the stage for analysis in the final
section of this paper by highlighting  some patterns evident in the review of policy reforms to
promote domestic competition. First, problems with implementation appear to be related to the
way in which specific policies are formulated: putting in place 'one-stop shops' to ease the
bureaucratic hurdles for putative entrants seems to be organizationally  more difficult to achieve
than does abolishing  entry prerequisites;  similarly.  problems of implementation appear to be
more substantial where investment  incentives  are streamlined than where they are abolished.
Second, there appear to be significant  variations among countries in the scope and adoption of
reforms to promote domestic competition:  while some countries (Tunisia and Guinea)" ' adopted
extensive reforms both to eliminate regulatory prerequisites to entry and to reform investment
incentives,  others (Ghana and Kenya) made no serious reform efforts in either area; and some
n For an extended analysis  of the political economy of Philippine cronyism,  see Stephan
Haggard, "The Political Economy  of the Philippine Debt Crisis",  in Joan Nelson (ed.) Economic
Crisis and Policy Choice (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, forthcoming 1989).
23 For this judgement, see The World Bank, Philippines: Fourth Small and Medium
Industries Development Proiect  Report number 7531-PH,  March 15, 1989,  p. 4.
2' The criteria stated by the Government of Mauritius for these 'exceptional  cases' in its
1987  statement of industrial policy remain quite general. In practice, the granting of
development certificates fell into abeyance  even prior to 1987,  with 12 certificates granted in
fiscal year 1984, 3 in fiscal year 1985,  and none in 1986.
-' Mauritius and the Philippines  might be included in this group insofar as both countries
made extensive reforms of investment incentives,  while entry apparently was liberalized  at the
outset ot the reform efforts.- 17-
countries (Pakistaui  and Bangladesh)  made substantial advances in easing regulatory obstacla  to
entry but not in reforming investment incentives,  while others (Mexico) reformed investment
incenatives  but not entry prerequisites. Third, there appear to be significant  variations among
countries in the extent of difficulties  with implementation;  for Ghana and Guinea in particular,
organizational  obstacles to reforming the environment for domestic competition appear to have
been substantial.
The Promotion of Export Productio
Within the larger set of policies that promote export production, the paper
reviews from an institutional perspective  efforts to put in place administrative  instruments
intended to secure 'trade neutrality"' for exporters -- that is, to secure access to imported (or
local) inputs free of import duties or other indirect taxes.n
As was evident from the earlier review  of import liberalization,  and as Table 6
summarizes, not one of the twelve countries in the sample has moved to an entirely liberal
import regime with no quantitative restrictions and low and uniform tariffs. Import liberalization
appears to have proceeded furthest in Ghana, Morocco and Mexico;  but even in these countries
some imports continue to be subject to quantitative restrictions, and others subject to nominal
tariffs in excess ot 50%Yo.  The combination of high-cost,  low quality locally-produced  inputs, and
imported inputs either unavailable  or subject to high tariffs inhibits the ability  of putative
exporters to compete in international markets.
3' The phrase is from Yung Whee Rhee, 'Instruments for Export Policy  and Administration:
Lessons from the East Asian Experience",  World Bank Staff Working Papers Number 725, 1985.
32  Additional policies to promote exports that might usefully  be reviewed from a
institutional perspective but were beyond the scope of this paper include direct export subsidies
and their administration, mechanisms  to secure access to working capital for exporters, and
various arrangements to provide technical and marketing support for potential exporting firms.
Rhee 'Instruments for Export Policy' provides substantial detail on the appropriate organization
of mechanisms to secure access to working capital. Three papers by Don Keesing -- 'How to
Provide High Impact Assistance to Manufactured Exports from Developing  Countries",  (with
Andrew Singer) The World Bank. Trade Policy  Division,  PPR, mimeo, September 1989; "What
Goes Wrong in Official Promotion and Marketing Assistance for Manufactured Exports from
Developing  Countries"  (with Andrew Singer) The World Bank, Trade Policy  Division, PPR,
mimeo, September 1989; and 'The Four Successful  Exceptions",  UNDP-World Bank Trade
Expansion Program Occassional  Paper 2  September 1988  -- provide rich, institutionally  sensitive
analysis  of the design of technical and marketing  support.- 18  -
TABLE:  PROGRESS OF TRADE POUCY REFORM IN THE SAMPLE COUNTRIES
Range of  Range of
Imports subject to  Nominal  Effective
COUNTRY '  Quantitative Restrictions  Tariffs  Tariffs
Bangladesh  27% of all items  0 - 400%  2.5 - 200%
(1987)
Ghana  QRs essentially  removed  0 - 35%  2S -90%
(1989)
Guinea  QRs formally removed  10 - 50%  no information
(1988)
Kenya  55% of all items  no information  0 - 80% for
(1987)  18% of import value  past 1985  60% of imports
Jamaica  11% of all items  10 - 60%  <10>  - 75%
(1988)  (manufacturing)
Mauritius  QRs removed  0 - 450%  <24>  - 800%
(1987)
Mexico  22% of local production  0 - 20%  0 - 50%
(1989)
Morocco  11% of items, 14% of import  0 - 45%  11 - 180%
(1989)  value
Pakistan  34% of all items  0 - 225%  0 - 80% for
(1989)  50% of all goods
Philippines  34% of all items; 16.4% of  10 - 50%  18 - 144%
(1987)  import value
Thailand  QRs removed  0 - 60%  10 - 100%
(1988)
Tunisia  70 - 90% of local  production  15 - 41%  no information
(1988)
Note: /a.  Year cited represents last obtainable data, not date of reports
referenced..19  -
Further, as noted earlier, the persistence of import protection among even the boldest
reformers points to governmental inability  or unwillingness  to confront head-on some political
obstacles to full liberalization;n  endless exhortation (necessary  as it may be) as to the virtues of
full hberalization  is likely to be limited in its impact. Given these constraints, the short-run task
for policy reform is to find ways to encourage exports while finessing  political obstacles; the
long-run task is to help strengthen a constituency  which would gain from further liberal reform.
Putting in place instruments to secure trade neutrality is one way to move forward with these
tasks.
Table 7 disaggregates  among the various instruments designed to secure trade
neutrality that have been put in place by ten of the twelve countries" in the sample. Provisions
for firms to draw back customs duties
and indirect taxes paid on imported inputs used in exports are used most widely  (in ten of the
twelve countries), followed  by arrangements where firms specializing  entirely in exports are
afforded 'bonded' status, enab!ing them to bypass  standard customs formalities  and duty/tax
exemption arrangements (in seven countries), followed  by various instruments intended to
extend application of the instruments to indirect exporters that supply locally  produced inputs to
exporters (six countries), by geographically  delineated export processing  zones (in five
countries), and by the provision of bonded warehouses into which imports can be imported
outside of standard customs procedures (in four countries). Ceographically  delineated export
processing zones aside, the World Bank has actively  promoted the establishment  of these
various instruments.
Administration  of the instruments of trade neutrality presents three distinct
organizational  challenges. First, there is the challenge of providing  the broadest possible access
to the export instruments -- access for firms that produce for both the domestic and export
markets as well as for specialized  exporters, access to indirect (suppliers of inputs into export
items) as well as direct exporters, and access for smaller and medium-sized  as well as for large
firms.
3 lnstitutional obstacles aside, many economists continue to acknowledge  with varying
degrees of enthusiasm the normative  case for some protection against import competition. See,
for example, Howard Pack and Larry E. Westphal, "Industrial  Strategy and Technological
Change",  Journal of Develovment Economics 1986;  Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: Late
Industrialization  in South Korea  1989;  Jeffrey Sachs, "Trade and Exchange Rate Policies in
Growth-Oriented  Adjustment Programs",  Harvard Universit,, mimeo, 1987; Dani Rodrik,
"Lberalization, Sustainability,  and the Design of Structural Adjustment Programs"  The World
Bank and Harvard University,  January 1989;  and Tyler Biggs  and Brian Levy, "Strategic
Interventions and the Political Economy  of Industrial Policy  in Developing  Countries",  in Dwight
Perkins and Michael Roemer (eds.) Economic Systems  Reform in Developing Countries
(Harvard, forthcoming 1990). W. M. Corden, Trade Policy  and Economic Welfarc (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1974) acknowledges  that as a practical matter the second best case for import
protection as a means of infant industry support is quite strong.
9  It is noteworthy  that Guinea and Ghana - the two countries that have not put these
instruments into place - were identified in the previous section as the countries with the
weakest organizational  capability.- 20  -
Export  Facilities
Processing  Bonded  Bonded  Duty/Tax  Duty/Tax  for Indirect
Zom  Factories  Warehouses  Drawbacks  Exemvtion  Eprt
langladesh  Yes (80s)  Yes  Yes (81)  Yes (83)  Yes (89)
amaca  Yes (82)  - Yes (87)  -
Kna  Yes (89)  Yes (83)  - Yes (74)
Mauritius  Yes (70)  - Yes (80s)  Yes (80s)  Yes (87)
exico  Yes (64)  Yes (83)  Yes (83)  Yes (71)  Yes (83)  Yes (86)
Morocco  - Yes  - Yes  Yes  Yes
Pakistan  - Yes (86)  *  Yes (86)  . Yes (86)
Philippines  Yes  - Yes  *  Yes (81)  Yes  Yes (81)
Thailand  Yes (70s)  Yes (70s)  - Yes (60s)  Yes (60s)
Tunisia  . Yes (72)  Yes  Yes (71)  Yes (81)
Ghana
Guinea- 21 -
Second, there is the challenge of affording  rapid service to firms - of ensuring rapid access to
requisite imported inputs, and (where relevant) of ensuring rapid reimbursentent of duties or
taxes. Third, there is the challenge of efficiently  caiibrating the neutrality instruments -- of
ensuring that the instruments are used solely for the purposes intended, and (where relevant) of
calibrating reimbursements to approximate closely  the value of customs duties and indirect taxes
paid for intermediate inputs embodied in final exports.
Setting aside for the moment how they are used in practice, even in principle
the instruments vary in their abilities to meet the three challenges.  While export processing
zones and bonded factories can secure rapid, well-targeted duty and tax-free access to imported
inputs for export firms, almost by definition they promote enclaves,  excluding firms that
partipate in both domestic and forign  markets. Conversely,  while duty drawbacks and
exemptions can in principle be utilized by a broad range of firms, their implementation requires
a formidable administrative  apparatus not only to process rapidly applications for drawbacks,  but
also to calculate the many thousand input-output coefficients35  needed to compute accurately the
appropriate magnitudes of duty and tax rebates.
Table 8 summar zes the limited available information as to experience with
implementation of the instruments to secure trade neutrality. 3 Implementation  of export
processing zones and bonded factories appears to have proceeded quite smoothly in most
countries for which information is available.  As of 1985,  55 firms with exports valued at $416
million were located in export processing zones in the Philippines." Net foreign exchange
amrnings  in Jamaica's free zone rose from $1 million in 1982 to S32 million in 1987,  and
employment rose from under 1,000  to over 11,000.35  In Mauritius, the expansion of
manufactured exports from specialist  export firms was rapid almost immediately  after the
establishment of the bonded factory/EPZ  system in 1970,  and accelerated again in the 1980s  in
response to a further round of adjustment policies;  as of 1988 bonded factories accounted for
59% of export value and about 20% of Mauritius' employment."
M Rhee "Instruments  for Export Policy"  provides substantial detail as to how to administer
duty drawback  schemes.
3' Unlike the policy reforms examined earlier, there is no clearly identifiable  successful  end-
point against which progress in implementation can be guaged. Thus the categories for
comparing country performance necessarily  are different from those used earlier.
"  The World Bank, The PhiliD2ines:  Issues and Policies in the Industrial Sector  Report
Number 6706-PH, July 30, 1987. There is some question, however, whether the economic
benefits of the Philippines zones are larger than the economic costs, given the high costs
(compounded in at least one case by inappropriate location) of the infrastructure needed to
establish the zones.
3' The World Bank, Jamaica: Adjustment under Changing  Economic  Conditions. Report No.
7753-JM,  April 26, 1989,  p. 15
X Data provided by Professor E.L.M. Lim Fat in a seminar on 19 September, 1989 at the
IFC; see also E.L.M. Lim Fat 'The Mauritius Export Processing  Zone'  paper presented at
Enterprise Symposium,  UNCTIAD  VII, Geneva, July 1987. Mauritius' Export Zone is in fact an
administrative  category that extends island-wide;  hence its depiction here as a bonded factory
system.- 22  -
Z&"AMMMIE_EWMIMPLEMENTAll  N  OF  INSIMUMENTS
Export
Processing  Bonded  Bonded  Duty/Tax  Duty/Tax
Zomn  Factr  Wgy,sg  Drawbacks  Eemvtion
Bangladesh  Start-up  Good  Week  Weak
difficulties
Jamaica  Good after  Weak
initial
difficulties
Kenya  Too soon  Weak  Too soon
to tell  to tell
Mauritius  Good  Weak  Moderate
Mexico  Good  Moderate  Weak  Moderate
Morocco  Good
Pakistan  Too soon  Weak, prior
to tell  to 1986
Philippines  Good  Good  Weak  Weak
Thailand  Good  Improves over time;
good by 1988
Tunisia  Good  Weak  Weak*23-
Meadco's  border industry program was established in 1964,  but took off only after that country's
masive  1982 devluation;  by 1987 Mexaco's  maquiladora  program employed almost 400,000
people and accounted for 5.7% of export revenues.4 In Tunisia, a 1972 reform permitting
bonded factories laid the foundation for a 14% annual real increase in manufactures  exports
over the next decade. However, the Mexican,  Jamaican, Philippine and Tunisian arrangements
operate essentially  as enclaves isolated from manufacturers  producing for the domestic mai  ket. 4'
Table 8 points to rather more variation among countries in experience with
bonded warehouse and duty/tax  drawback  or exemption  schemes (most of the schemes to
support indirect exports are of too recent duration for useful information  on implementation to
have emerged; a priori, their experience is likely to correspond closely  with -- or be somewhat
worse than -- the broader experience with drawback  or exemption schemes). The Philippines
bonded warehoue  scheme appears to have worked well, especially  for garments and textiles
firms who in 1985 channelled $619 million  of exports through these arrangements; by contrast,
drawback  and exemption schemes  became mired in exzessive  and discretionary  bureaucratic
procedures, and afforded firms only $12 million in customs and tax rebates in 1985.42  Similarly,
bonded warehouses for Bangladeshi  garment exporters have operated successfully;  although the
Bangladeshi government continues to work to improve performance," experience with other
instruments tnus far has been less satisfactory.  Kenya's bonded manufacturing  scheme has not
got off the ground, mired in an administrative  swamp throughout the Five  years since It first was
announced; similarly,  only forty companies regularly take advantage  of Kenya's duty drawback
scheme, even though it has been in place for over ten years.4
Among the remaining  countries, in Thailand implementation of drawback  and
exemption schemes  appears to have improved continually  over time, with the ratio between
But note that according to data from The World Bank, Mexico:  Trade Policy Reform and
Economic  Adiustment. August 23, 1988 p. 55, maquila exports were only one-sixth  as large as
total Mexican manufactures  exports; Joseph Grunwald,  'Technology Transfer and Assembly
Industries' draft May 1989 evaluates quite positively  the developmental  contribution to Mexico
of the maquila factories.
41 Although the Mauritius  scheme is also solely for 100% exporters, it is difficult to describe
as an enclave an arrangement that employs 20% of a nation's work force.
a The World Bank, The PhiligRines:  Issues and Policies in the Industrial Sector. It is
interesting to note that the administration of bonded warehouses for garments and textile (but
not other) exports is handled by the Garments and Textiles Export Board, an agency
independent of the Philippines  Bureau of Customs. The garment and textile facility  handled
almost three times the value of imports, and five times the number of firms as did the Customs
bureau.
43  The World Bank, Bangladesh:  Export Development  Project. Report Number 7368-BD,
March  22, 1989, pp. 6-8.
i  The World Bank, Industrial Sector Adiustment Credit: President's Re2ort  May 24, 1988;
also The World Bank, Kenya: Industrial Sector Policies for Investment and Exort  Growth.
Report Number 6711-IKE,  June 30, 1987,  p.38.-24  -
duties returned to firms (via drawback  or exemption) and actual duty collection rising from 25%
in 1983 to 60% in 1987.4  In both  Mauritius and Mexico,  exemption schemes have been
significantly  more successful than drawback arrangements. Mauritius' duty exemption scheme is
used by relatively large firms that produce regularly for both domestic and import markets; the
drawback  scheme, which involves  cumbersome procedures and significant  delays prior to
repayment, is used by few manufacturers.  In Mexico,  imports valuing $2.8 billion were processed
in 1987  via that country's temporary import duty exemption scheme, while the duty drawback
scheme was used for only $200 million  of imports; the coverage of both schemes was narrow,
with only 463 firms taking advantage  of the temporary admissions,  and 186 r rms the duty
drawback,  schemes.'*  Morocco's temporary admissions  scheme (a duty exemption scheme in the
nomenclature used here) apparently has worked well, with continual reduction in the
bureaucratic requirements and processing time associated  with gaining access to duty-free
imports by exporters.7 As for Jamaica, Pakistan and Tunisia, the limited evidence available
suggests that administrative  sluggishness  in responding to applications  and difficulties  in
managing the array of input-output coefficients  have severely circumscribed  the utility to
putative exporters of drawback  and exemption  shemes.
Two patterns emerge from this review of experience. First, enclave arrangements
such as bonded factories and export processing zones appear to be the most readily
implementable of the trade neutrality schemes. However, insofar as enclaves separate exporters
from the domestic economy, these schemes seem to do relatively little to diffuse more broadly
the positive learning externalities associated witL  exports or to broaden the constituency  for
further liberal reform. Second, countries with sufficiently  strong organizational  capabilities
appear able to make effective use of drawback  and exemption  schemes,'  thereby capturing
many of the benefits associated with exports and sustaining the transition to a liberal policy
environment.
IV.  ANALYSIS  AND IMPLICATIONS  OF COUNTRY EXPERIENCE
Two tasks remain for this final section of the paper. The first task is to lay out
some general propositions that account for the variations among countries and policies in the
I  Additional tax exemptions provided to firmns  promoted by the Board of Investmen.
amounted to more than 120% of duty collected on intermediates and raw materials. Data are
from The World Bank, Thailand: Country Economic Memorandum. 1989 p. 63.
* Details are from The World Bank, Mexico:  Trade Policy  Reform and Economic
Adjustment, 1988, p. 69. According  to that report, there are several thousand exporting firms
(excluding  the maquilas) in Mexico,  with the 600 largest accounting for less than 60% of total
non-oil exports.
" For this judgement, see The World Bank Morocco: The Impact of Liberalization.  Report
No. 6714-MOR, March 15, 1988, p. 25.
^  Alog  with the countries discussed  in the text, both Taiwan and especially  Korea made
ateive  use of duty drawback  and exemption  schemes for direct as well as indirect exporters
in the course of their successful  efforts at outward-oriented  industrial development.-25-
scope, adoption and implementation  of policy  reform; given the relatively  small number of
observations and the non-random character of the sample, these propositions necessarily  are
tentative. The second task is to delineate the operational implications  of these propositions for
the design of trade and investment policy reform.
Accounting for the Patterns
As explained  earlier, policy  changes were disaggregated  along the dimensions  of
scope, adoption and implementation  as an initial way to distinguish  between political and
organizational  obstacles to reform: limitations in scope and adoption can straightforwardly  be
attributed to political obstacles, while organizational  obstacles emerge disproportionately  in
implementation (although note that implementation problems can have political as well as
organizational  origins).
This subsection makes use of these distinctions to analyze first variations among
policy  reforms in the magnitude  of their organizational  requirements, thereafter variations
among countries in their organizational  capabilities,  and finally  variations among countries in
political obstacles to reform.
The organizational-intensity  of Rolicv  reform. Tables 8 and 9 together point to
some systematic  variations among policies in the extent of problems assocxiated  with
implementation.
As Table 9 summarizes,  implementation was an obstacle in only 1 (3 if Kenya
and Guinea's experiences with QR reform are included; both fell short of full achievement  but
made significant  progress) of 23 instances of trade policy  reform, but in 2 of 7 (11 if countries
with free entry prior to reform are included in the sample) instances of reform of regulatory
obstacles to entry, and in 3 (5 if Thailand and Tunisia are included;  both fell short of full
achievement but made significant  progress) of 9 instances of investment  incentive reform. A
parallel contrast is evident in Table 8, with good implementation in 8 of the 11 instances to
establish export processing zones, bonded factories and bonded warehouses for which
information is available, but weak implementation in 10 of the 15 efforts to set up duty and tax
drawback  or exemption schemes; within the last category, implementation was more successful
for exemption than for drawback  schemes. Three propositions help account for these variations
in implementation and in associated organizational  obstacles.
First, the task of dismantling  policies inimical to efficient economic growth
appears to be relatively  simple organizationally.  This is not always  evident in World Bank
assessments  of experience only because political obstacles often are not distinguished  from
organizational  problems. The elimination  of quantitative restrictions and the abolition
(as opposed to streamlining) of bureaucratic prerequisites to entry pose essentially  a negative
challenge for bureaucracies -- to refrain from actions that had hitherto been part of their
organizational function. Similarly,  the implementation (as opposed to plann;ng) of tariff reform
also requires relatively little of organizations;  it requires no changes in organizational  behavior,
merely changes in the numerical values associated with routine operations. Guinea aside, the
empirical review of experience with these three reforms uncovered almost no evidence of
difficulties  in implementatiorn  -- although there remains the risk that where disabling  policies
were dismantled but implementing  organizations  left otherwise untouched, the implementing
organizations  will over time uncover roundabout mechanisms for reasserting their authority.- 26  -
TABLE 9s  VARIATIONS BY POLICY IN EXTENT OF REFORM
Number of Countries  Number of  Number of Countries
with Limited/Moderate  Countries with  with at Least
Scope or Adoption  Limited Progress  Extensive Scope &
in Implementation  Significant  Progess
in Adoption and
Implementation
Removal of QR's  6  0  (2)  7
Tariff Reform  4  1  6
Reform of
Entry Regulations  3  2  3  (7) u
Reform of
Investment
Incentives  3  3  (5) v  3  (1)  v
TOTAL  16  6  19
v  Bracketed figures are explained in the text.-27  -
As the experience with SECOFI in Mexico revealed, securing forebearance can sometimes be
politicaly challenging;  but given the political capacity  of government leadership to impose its
will, there appear to be only limited organizational  obstacles to dismantling  disabling policies.
Second, the results bear out what one might expect: it is more demanding
organizationally  to reorient existing  institutions than to dismantle them. Where reforms involve
the establishment of 'one-stop shops' for new entrants or the streamlining  of investment
incentives,  investment agencies are expected to alter the criteria used to evaluate applications,.
to accelerate the application process, and more broadly  to shift from a bureaucratic to a
supportive mode of operation in relation to the private sector. Where reforms involve the
establishment  of duty/tax  drawback  and exemption schemes it is customs and fiscal agencies that
need to reform their organizational  procedures. Only Morocco and Thailand (and also, to a
lesser degree, Mauritius and Mexico)  succeeded in putting in place effective  drawback and
exemption schemes; and none of the countries analyzed  were successful in reorienting
investment agencies (although the record in Tunisia is the least unfavorable).  The contrast
between Mauritius' and Mexico's  experience with investment reform and that of other countries
illustrstes the general proposition. Only in Mexico  and Mauritius did the implementation of
investment incentive reform proceed smoothly;  and only in these two countries did investment
reform involve  the abolition of investment  incentives,  not an effort to streamline them.
Similarly,  entry liberalization proceeded smoothly  in Bangladesh,  Pakistan and Tunisia where
bureaucratic prerequisites were eliminated, but became bogged down in Ghana where they were
streamlined.
Third, not surprisingly  it is organizationally  easier to establish administrative
enclaves than it is to reform more broadly the existing  bureaucracy.  Thus enclave arrangements
such as bonded factories and export processing zones appear to be the most readily
implementable of the trade neutrality schemes, most likely precisely because they are enclaves
and hence can be administered entirely separately from the wider bureaucratic apparatus of
government. Along the same lines, in both Bangladesh  and the Philippines,  bonded
manufacturing  warehouses were successful  where they were run by independent agencies set up
to serve the garment and textile export industries, but were less successful  where they were part
of the general customs administration.
Variations among countries in organizational  capabilities.  Tables 8 and 10
together.  point to some variations among countries in the extent of implementation difficulties
and associated organizational  capabilities.
Among the sample countries, organizational  capacity  appears to be greatest for
Morocco, Thailand, Mexico  and Mauritius, and weakest for Ghana and Guinea, with the
remaining  six countries in between. The four organizationally  well-endowed  countries not only
implemented relatively  smoothly their reforms to promote domestic and i-mnport  competition, all
four also operated highly  successful  enclaves for exporters, and managed drawback/exemption
schemes with at least moderate success.  By contrast, neither Guinea nor Ghana attempted to
put in place instruments to secure trade neutrality; further, both countries experienced problems
with implementation of the organizationally  straightforward  task of dismantling  institutions
inimical to economic growth.- 28 -
The example of Guinea illustrates  with special vividness  the nature and origins
of the organizational  shortfills.  Guinea was the only country in the sample where
implementation problems systematicaDy  undermined efforts to dismantle the disabling
environment across the entire range of policies. These difficulties  in implementation reflect the
extreme degradation of the bureaucratic structure inherited by a new government which came to
power in 1985 after 25 years of rule by President Sekou Toure. By all accounts the degree of
decomposition  of government authority over tbe bureaucracy  was substantially  greater than for
any of the other countries of the sample: lacking newspapers,  or gazettes publishing government
laws and decrees, there were no effective channels of communication  within the government or
between the government and the general public; official  salries  were minimal,  yet there was
enormous padding of the number of bureaucratic functionaries formally  vested with some kind
of official authority-,  many bureaucrats were ilHiterate,  many had no offices, let alone office
supplies. With the bureaucratic apparatus in an advanced state of decomposition,
notwithstanding  an apparently unequivocal  commitment to economic adjustment, the new regime
was unable to control the anarchically  decentralized  obstruction of reform described earlier for
the various policies. Hence the Guinean failure to manage the implementation even of policies
which, as outlined above, posed relatively modest organizational  challenges.-'
Variations among countries in political  obstacles to reform. Tables 9 and 10
suggest that political obstacles have been rather more important in inhibiting import
lberalization and the liberalization  of domestic competition$'  than have organizational
limitations. While reform proceeded smoothly in only 18 of 4051  cases, implementation problems
inhibited change in just 6 (9 if significant  progress in implementation  is interpreted to be a
problem) of the 22 examples where adjustment ran into difficulties;  obstacles associated with
limitations in scope and adoption (presumably  reflecting political constraints on reform) were a
problem in 17 instances.
Disaggregating  among countries, table 10 points to significant  cross-country
variations in the extent of political obstacles to trade and investment  policy reform.
4 For a review of institutional shortcomings  in Ghana, see Samuel Paul, "Private Sector
Assessment:  A Pilot Exercise in Ghana", The World Bank, Policy  Planning and Research,
Working Paper Number 199, May 1989.
s Note, though, the alternative possibility  that even Guinea's problems had a significant
political component. Political problems might have surfaced at the implementation stage rather
han earlier insofar as Guinea had no alternative other than to go along with the World Bank
as a way of gaining access to desperately  needed foreign exchange.
"I  As noted earlier, the establishment of instruments to secure trade neutrality poses few
political problems insofar as it does not threaten with losses any powerful interests within the
government bureaucracy  or society more broadly.
n Entry leraliation  in Ghana was both limited in scope and had only limited progress in
impimentation;  thus this reform is included in two columns in Tables 9 and 10.- 29  -
TABLE  10: VARIATIONS BY COUNTRY IN EXTENT  OF REFORM
Number of Policies  Number of  Number of
with at Lest  Extensive  Policies with  Policies with
Scope and Significant  Limited/Moderate  Limited Progress
Progress in Adoption  Scope or Limited  in Implementation
and Implementation l  Progress in
Adoption
Guinea  1  (1)  0  3
Ghana  2  (2)  1  2
Mexico  3  (2)  1  0
Morocco  2  (2)  0  0
Tunisia  3  (1)  1  0
Mauritius  2  (1)  1  0
Pakdstan  1  (0)  3  0
Bangladesh  1  (0)  3  0
Kenya  1  (1)  3  0
Phiilippines  1  (1)  1  1
Thailand  1  (1)  2  0
Jamaica  1  (1)  0  0
TOTAL  18  17  6
The bracketed figures signify  the number of import liberalization policies in this category.30  -
The differences are especially  striling between Meaico, Tunisia, Guinea and Ghana on the one
hand, and Kenya, Pakistan and Bangladesh  on the other  the former group of countries adopted
broad reforms in at least three of the four policies (though Guinea ran into difficulties  in
implementing  most of these reforms); in the latter group by contrast, scope was limited or
moderate, or progress in adoption limited, for at least three of the four policies.
A thorough accounting  of the reasons for these differences would require
analyses  of the political economy of  ch nation that extend well beyond the reach of the
present paper. However, the patterns appear consistent with a central conclusion of a recent
comparative volume of the politics of adjustment in thirteen developing countries edited by Joan
Nelson.5'  According  to that study, successful  reformers shared two core features that were
absent to some degree in countries where reform lagged:
'the widespread perception of the need for far-reaching  reforms (resulting from
a legacy of economic decline and political decay or acute chailbnge) and an
executive  empowered by some combination  of established political institutions
and more transient circumstances  with an unusual concentration of
authority.54
Notwithstanding  its overall consistency  with the results summarized  in this
paper,55  Nelson's conclusion  fails to account for observed differences among the sample
countries in the relative magnitudes of trade and investment reforms: Mexico,  Morocco and
Ghana achieved significantly  greater success in liberalizing  imports - via both the elimination of
quantitative restrictions and tariff reforms -- than they did in liberalizing  domestic competition;
by contrast the reform of the environment for domestic competition went further than did
import liberalization in Tunisia, Bangladesh  and Pakistan. While more research as to the
reasons for these differences is needed, potential explanations  include variations among
countries in the extent to which domestic regulation functioned as a mechanism  of political
control (or rent-seeking), variations among countries in the political influence of domestic
industry (including  state-owned enterprises) and factory  workers and in the associated
53.  Joan Nelson (ed.) Economic  Crisis and Policy  Choice: The Politics  of Adiustment in
DeveloDing  Countries (Princeton: Princeton University  Press, 1989). The countries analyzed in
the volume are Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,  Chile, Peru, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, Jamaica, Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria.
54  Joan Nelson, 'Introduction' in Nelson (ed.) Economic  Crisis and Policy  Choice  pp. 44-45
draft manuscript.
'5 Among the countries included in the present analysis that adopted broad reforms, Mexico
and Ghana were included in the analyses  that led to the conclusion  quoted above; at least in
some degree, Tunisia shares the two core features identified by Nelson of widespread
perception of the need for far-reaching  reforms and strong executive authority; and Guinea's
post-1985  military government had far-reaching  powers, at least formally.  As for the cases of
half-hearted reform, along with the Philippines (analyzed  directly in the volume), the Kenyan
exPeriece  alxo appeas  consistent with Nelson's conclusion  insofar as the well-documented
importance in that nation of regional and ethnic patronage as a mechanism  of political control
constrains substantially  the autonomy of that nation's executive.31 -
willingness  of governments to expose them to import competition, and variations among
countries in the agendas for reform of international donor agencies.
Im2iiLatis  for the Design of Trade and Investment Policy  Reform
There are three different approaches to incorporating  the institutional
considerations that have been the focus of the present paper in the design of structural
adjustment lending. The first is to ignore them entirely, and design programs on the assumption
that publ;c organizational  capabilities  and the political commitment to reform will be
forthcoming;  as should be obvious from this paper, the policy changes actually implemented  via
that approach, and the subsequent economic responses, are likely to be quite different from the
initial intentions of the reformers.
The second approach is to acknowledge  the reality of institutional constraints
but to include them more or less as an afterthought, earmarldng technical assistance for weak
institutions only after the reform package has been designed on the basis of other
considerations.  This approach clearly is preferable to ignoring entirely institutional capabilities.
Even so, its potential is limited insofar as it leaves entirely unaddressed problems posed by
political obstacles to reform, and p'resumes  (optimistically)  that technical assistance will be
sufficient to enhance organizational  capability  even in the short-term.
The third approach is to bring institutional considerations to center stage,
designing  and sequencing programs in ways that are consistent with the capabilities  of the
reforming nation. Ex ante assessments  of organizational  capabilities  within the public sector, and
of the political preferences and room to manoeuvre of the national leadership are crucial inputs
in any such effort. Although a body of knowledge  is emerging as to how to proceeed with
political and organizational  assessments, 5 ' the present paper has focused rather on ex post
evaluation of political and organizational  obstacles as a way of clarifying  concretely how
programs to reform trade and investment  policy might usefully  be matched to country
capabilities.  The analysis  has highlighted  variations among policies in their organizational  and
political requirements, and variations among countries in their organizational  capabilities  and
political commitments to change. These variations point to significant  differences among
countries in the potential for -- and appropriate sequence of -- policy reform. Specifically,  while
the prospects for policy  reform are nil where both the political commitment to pursue reform
and the organizational  capacity  to effect reform are absent, reform might usefully  be pursued
where one of these two institutional foundations  for change is in place. However, the preferred
reform strategy will vary with the balance prevailing  in any individual  country between political
commitment and organizational  capability.
Consider first countries with substantial political commitment to reform but only
"6  For an overview  of the relevant components of institutional assessments,  see two papers
by Samuel Paul 'Institutional Diagnosis  in World Bank Projects",  CECPS, draft, June 2, 1989
and 'Institutional Development at the Sectoral Level: A Cross-sectoral  Review of Bank
Project", CECPS, drft,  November 15, 1989.  A recent political assessment of the opportunities
and constraints of reform in Algeria prepared by a consultant for the EMENA region - Vedat
Milor, "Algeria:  A Country at the Crossroads",  draft, June 30, 1988 - has apparently proven
useful in the formulation of a reform program for that country.- 32 -
weak orpnizational  capabilities.  Among those anabzed here, Ghana and Guinea fit most closely
into this category, the category also fits other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa quite well.
Reform in these countries should give special emphasis to the dismantling  - not reorientation -
of dibling  policies, institutions and regulations. Free entry for firms should be favored over
the establishment of one-stop shops to streamline the bureaucratic process; special incentives
for selected industries should be abolished, not rewritten to favor socially  efficient subsidization;
import hiberalization  should be pursued to the maximum  extent possible, not finessed via the
promotion of instruments of trade neutrality.
RaLical  measures of this kind are called for not because wholesale dismantling
ecessaily represents the optimum optimorum, but because it is the only plausible way of
effecting real change in the face of pervasive  organizational  rigidities. Even after the dismantling
effort h  proceeded to the maximum  extent possible, the risk remains that the combination of
orpnizational  sclerosis and a weak private sector will inibit  a supply response. Given this risk,
it is hardly surprising that many countries with weak public and private institutions are
exceedingly  reluctant to push ahead with lieral  economic reforms. But if the analysis  in this
paper is correct, countries with substantial political autonomy but limited organizational
capability have no middle course, no realistic alternative but to choose between the certainty of
continued stagnation without reform, or non-incremental  shrinkage in the size and role of
government, a shrinkage that in the short- and medium-term may go unrewarded by a positive
supply response. In these countries, World Bank adjustment programs that promote
oranizationally-demanding reforms complemented  by resources for organizational  development
are likely to be of limited usefulness.
The desirable strategy for sequencing reform is quite different -- and the initial
choices significantly  lss  stark - for countries with strong organizational  capabilities but only
limited political flexibility  or commitment to effect reform. Even in response to compelling
economic analysis,  such countries are unlikely to dismantle existing  policies -- import
restrictions, restrictions on domestic competition, regulatory prerogatives of government
bureaucrats and the like - in ways that challenge existing interests." So the task for these
nations is to use their organizational  strengths to provide export opportunities to efficient firms
in ways that strengthen the constituency  for further reform, without challenging  head-on the
interests that benefit most from inefficient policies. The sequence of reforms in both Mauritius
and Thailand, the two development successes  of the 1980s  included in the sample is consistent
with such a strategy  5 in both countries the establishment of instruments of trade neutrality to
support exporters preceded by some years efforts at import liberalization.  The implication
follows  that, at kast  in the initial period of reform, the World Bank might do well to focus
policy dialogue on export promotion and ease pressure to liberalize imports in countries with
57 Although note that some organizationally  strong countries may be able to dismantle
obstacles to domestic but not import competition, and other countries the reverse. It is
unambiguously  desirable to proceed with di-mantling obstacles to domestic competition.
However, insofar as domestic rigidities inhibit adjustment to increased import competition,
countries have the option of using their administrative  capabilities  to promote exports without
dismantling  entirely the obstacles to import competition.
" Both Korea and Taiwan also followed  the sequence of export first, liberalize imports
later.- 33 -
limited political flexbility but substantial organizational  capability.5
A more difficult  choice emerges for countries with moderate organizational
capabilities  within the public sector. The risk here is that efforts to promote exports will fail to
yield much success in the face of administrative  limitations,  but will nonetheless substitute for
other, politically  more difficult,  reforms. In such countries, the case might be strong for
technical assistance targeted to strengthen the capability  of the institutions that manage the
instruments of trade neutrality. As analyzed  earlier, the organizational  task is likely to be
simpler where the relevant agencies can be set up as enclaves,  operating entirely separately
from the wider bureaucratic apparatus of government. Consistent  with this roundabout strategy
is the recent establishment of a system of bonded factories in Kenya (and earlier enclave efforts
in Tunisia and the Philippines). However, instruments of trade neutrality can help sustain the
dynamic  of reform only if they extend opportunities for participation in export markets beyond
specialist  exporters to both indirect exporters and firms that produce for protected domestic
markets; it remains unclear whether administrative  enclaves can be organized in ways that reach
this broad range of firms.*
Finally,  there are countries favored with both the organizational  capability  and
the political flexibility  and commitment to effect reform. Such countries face no institutional
obstacles to pursuing the liberal policies of reform promoted by the World Bank. But they can
equally readily move forward with roundabout policies that make intensive use of the
instruments of trade neutrality as well as other administration-intensive  measures to induce
firms to export.  As the successful East  Asian examples of development  reveal,  these  latter
policies - though  illiberal in the short-term  -- can be highly effective in promoting  dynamically
efficient economic development.
'  The experience summarized in The World Bank, "Strengthening  Trade Policy  Reform",
Trade Policy Division,  Country Economics  Department, PPR, October 1989  suggests that in
many instances the Bank has indeed been sensitive to the advantages of 'export-first'
sequencing.
^  The positive experience with bonded warehouses for garment and textile firms in both
the Philippines and Bangladesh  affords some grounds for optimism.PRkE  Wrklg  Poor  Seris
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